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Abstract
Amartya Sen has at various times referred to the Indian fourth cen-
tury BCE thinker Kautilya. Kautilya’s treatise Arthaśāstra (literally 
the ‘science of economy or material wellbeing’) explored possibili-
ties of social choice. My paper attempts to delineate the connec-
tions between Sen’s deployment of (and sometimes dissatisfaction 
with) ancient Indian rational thought, in particular the ethical im-
plications of Kautilya’s arguments about the welfare of the people: 
“in the happiness of the subjects lies the happiness of the king [i.e. 
the state] and in what is beneficial to the subjects his own benefit. 
What is dear to himself is not beneficial to the king, but what is 
dear to the subjects is beneficial (to him).” How the notion of wel-
fare is defined and what specific measures are advocated and put 
in place is as central in Kautilya’s work as it is differentially central 
to our own times. Ultimately, both Kautilya and Sen are acutely 
aware that just institutions do not necessarily ensure social justice, 
however it is conceived.
Keywords statecraft, Kautilya, welfare state, social choice theory, 
justice, differential commonality, ‘Amartya Sen’. 
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Introduction: utility and social choice theory
For Bentham (1789), Mill (1861), and Sidgwick (1907) to say that one 
thing has greater utility than another is to say that the former re-
sults in more pleasure or happiness than the latter. This classic util-
itarian interpretation of utility has one difficulty in that there may 
not be a single good that rationality urges one to pursue. Utility, 
broadly conceived, includes all imaginably desirable ends: pleas-
ure, health, knowledge, peace, friendship, etc.; and designating 
utilities to these ends or options inevitably invites comparison. 
Contemporary decision theorists typically interpret utility as a 
measure of preference. Central to this approach is that preferences 
apply not just between outcomes, that is, amounts of pleasure, or 
combinations of knowledge and pleasure, but also between uncer-
tain possibilities or likelihoods.
In the words of Amartya Sen: “[s]ocial choice theory deals with 
the aggregation of some measure of individual welfare into a collec-
tive measure. It takes different forms according both to what is be-
ing aggregated (interests, judgements, and so on) and to the pur-
pose of the aggregation” (2008). Utilitarian ethics call for maximizing 
this aggregate, and it is not too far out to suggest that Kautilya, the 
ancient Indian political philosopher, is setting up something close 
to a welfare equation even though it is strongly state-centric: “In the 
happiness of the subjects lies the happiness of the king and in what 
is beneficial to the subjects his own benefit. What is dear to himself 
is not beneficial to the king, but what is dear to the subjects is ben-
eficial [to him] (AS 1.19.34).1
While Amartya Sen’s work has demonstrated that ordinal prefer-
ences are insufficient for making satisfactory social choices, one of 
the most prominent thinkers of social choice theory (or how to gauge 
a society’s welfare from that of its members), Kenneth Arrow, from 
whom Amartya Sen draws, held the view “that interpersonal com-
parison of utilities has no meaning and … that there is no meaning 
relevant to welfare comparisons in the measurability of individual 
utility” (1951/1963, 9).2 Going beyond the negative implications of 
Arrow’s theorem, most social choice theorists today focus instead 
on the trade-offs involved in uncovering satisfactory decision pro-
cedures. In Sen’s work this is the ‘possibilist’ interpretation (1998) 
of social choice theory.
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Preferences can be selfish or self-interested in ‘expected utility 
theory’, which attempts to explain how to choose rationally when 
one is not sure which outcome will result from one’s acts. Thinking 
about forms of behaviour, Sen (1977) has proposed that a person’s 
psychology is best characterised using the scale: (i) representing the 
person’s narrow self-interest; (ii) representing the person’s self-in-
terest understood more broadly to explain feelings of sympathy (as 
in the case of watching another person suffer), and (iii) representing 
the person’s commitments, which could involve acting against her 
self-interest, also broadly understood. The question that propels 
Sen’s work that Bentham also asks ‘what use is it?’ is a cornerstone 
of the modern state’s policy formation, and resonant today in ethics 
and political philosophy. While Bentham holds that even malicious 
pleasure is intrinsically good, that if nothing instrumentally bad is 
attached to the pleasure, it was wholly good as well, consequential-
ists as well as economists like Sen argue against such hedonistic 
value theory.  
The question I ask in this essay is where do we place Kautilya’s 
Arthaśāstra (a text more-or-less contemporaneous with Aristotle’s 
Politics) in terms of understanding his strictures concerning the 
king’s (congruent with the state) self-interest in maintaining, con-
solidating, and expanding the power of his realm vis-à-vis his sub-
jects?3 A caveat here is not to read him strictly as just a political phi-
losopher as the question of form and genre is central when engaging 
with old texts postcolonially;4 the tradition of artha and niti (the art 
of the political) as a realm of theoretical and practical reason is easily 
lost when rendering it in terms of modern disciplinary boundaries.5
While Kautilya does not write about pleasure or sadism, at least 
not directly, as a writer of statecraft – where utility is configured as 
both a structure of power as well as a motivation of action – he 
seems not overmuch concerned about value judgments.6 This, how-
ever, is not to suggest that he is entirely unethical in his thinking. 
Commentators defend him as having a “sane, moderate and bal-
anced view” (Rangarajan 1992: 36). He is seen as placing “great em-
phasis on the welfare of the people. His practical advice is rooted in 
dharma [or justice or that which is just]. But, as a teacher of practical 
statecraft, he advocated unethical methods in the furtherance of na-
tional interest” (36). Amongst the duties of the ruler, for example 
raksha or protection of the state, and palana or maintenance of law 
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and order, it is for Kautilya, safeguarding the welfare of the people 
(or yogakshema) that is supremely important. 
I argue that there is a broader idea of utility at work here in terms 
of the welfare of the king’s subjects if we recognise the interdepend-
ence (as Sen also stresses) between behavioural patterns and the 
role of institutions in achieving justice and responsive governance. 
Not only is individual well-being fundamental to utilitarianism, 
one can also concede that non-utilitarian views (were Kautilya’s vi-
sion to be cast in these terms), must be concerned with welfare too 
if they are affected by the interests of individuals and admit the 
virtue of kingly or state benevolence.
Arthaśāstra: realpolitik and prakṛti 
The two-millennia old text Arthaśāstra (translated variously as ‘sci-
ence of politics’, ‘political economy’, ‘treatise on success’, and ‘trea-
tise on well-being’) by Kautilya is a detailed treatise on statecraft and 
the art of government. The opening folios list the contents of the 
work, ranging from chapters on the ‘Establishment of Clandestine 
Operatives’, ‘Pacifying a Territory Gained’ to the ‘Surveillance of 
People with Secret Income’ and ‘Investigation through Interrogation 
and Torture’. This is perhaps the only complete text on non-religious 
affairs from early India. The seismic significance of the manuscript’s 
discovery in 1905 was such that it shifted the tectonic plates of Indol-
ogy that assumed Indians to be singularly spiritual beings. A strate-
gic work with its navel firmly gazing on power and worldly ends, it 
quickly became the cynosure for nationalists fighting colonialism. 
Mythological India, as it were, comes into ‘sudden history’:
...[the] text became a focal point with which to contest 
every cliche that had been used to define India. A society 
that allegedly never had a rational state suddenly acquired 
one; a society defined by a dreamy moralism suddenly 
acquired a narrative of steely realism; a society without a 
history of political thought acquired a master text in po-
litical theory; a society without sophisticated economic 
thinking acquired insight into the foundations of wealth; 
a society without a strategic culture acquired a veritable 
theory of international relations; a nation with ostensibly 
kvarter
a ademisk
academic quarter
Volume
14 100
The Uses of Kautilya’s Arthashastra
Prem Poddar
no political identity acquired a prehistory of political 
unity. (Mehta 2009)
In his famous lecture ‘Politics as a Vocation’, Max Weber was to 
declare the book as ‘radical Machiavellianism’; compared to it, We-
ber declared, Machiavelli’s The Prince is ‘harmless’. Juxtaposing the 
Arthaśāstra with other disquisitions on power and politics from its 
time, especially Plato or Aristotle, it becomes clear how Kautilya 
departs from them with their steady spotlight on morality. But giv-
en its focus on strategies and tactics, it comes as no surprise that it 
is The Prince, that upset ethical and religious beliefs in sixteenth cen-
tury Europe, that Arthaśāstra inevitably gets compared to.7
As a theoretical and normative work which features Kauṭilya’s 
realist statecraft, Arthaśāstra (ancient as it is) both converges and 
deviates from Machiavelli’s modern secular ethics. Most readings 
tend to foreground Kautilya’s political-theological ethos even as 
they compulsively return to his vision of a ruthless realpolitik. Just 
as his political realism (whether in terms of his contributions to in-
ternational relations theory or his how-to manual for hanging on to 
state power) does not go unnoticed, indeed gets firmly foreground-
ed, his writing gets reduced to an account of brahmanical guile (as 
Indian foreign policy sometimes gets cast as) sodden with a heavy 
dose of realism.8 There is, however, no repudiating the fact that 
apart from providing a blueprint of statecraft — familiar yet differ-
ent from the western models — an innovative theory of conquest, 
diplomacy and foreign policy (with atisaṃdhāna or outwitting at its 
heart) jumps out from his account. He warns, for instance, against 
attacking an opponent’s capital, and advocates chiselling in from 
the periphery, surreptitiously. His panoptic eye winks at the use of 
intellect, wit, cunning, guile, and deceit: ‘An arrow unleashed by an 
archer may kill a single man or not kill anyone,’ Kautilya notes, ‘but 
a strategy unleashed by a wise man kills even those still in the 
womb’(AS 10.6.51). In his typology of allies, he further distinguish-
es between an ally of ‘divers utility’ (as one who aids ‘in many ways 
with the products of his ports, villages, mines, forests and ele-
phants’) and ‘great utility’, as one who supplies forces and resourc-
es from the treasury (AS 7.9.40). 
My attempt here is to make the case that ultimately for Kautilya, 
political action – not just in times of war – implies optimizing prakṛti 
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(nature or primordial materiality) such that both the power of the 
state as well as the welfare of the people are insured. Yogakshema 
(prosperity and well-being of the people), Kautilya asserts time and 
again, is contingent upon the power of a ‘strong’ state.
Welfare:  nyāya and yogakshema
The Mauryan economy – where Kautilya is said to have served as 
chancellor and prime minister to Chandragupta (between c.321 and 
c.297 BCE) who first fuses together the disparate kingdoms of the 
subcontinent in an empire – arguably came closest to the one out-
lined by Kautilya. Various historians and political analysts have 
commented on its structure: it has been called a “socialized monar-
chy” (Wolpert 1982, 60), a kind of “state socialism” leaving enough 
space for the individual producer (Basham 1963, 218), and even at-
tributing to Kautilya “…with… [his] … concept of Yogakshema” as 
having established the first welfare state in the modern sense, and 
as also having been ignored as a pioneering thinker in this (and 
other) aspects by foreign scholars (Kohli 1995: xi). Kautilya’s econ-
omy, in the words of Boersche, is best described perhaps by the 
anthropologist Louis Dumont who sees the king (with whom the 
state is taken to be identical) running a “benevolent feudal manor” 
(Boersche 2002, 67).
Another commentator views Kautilya’s advocacy of the king as a 
father who took care of his subjects as children in terms of a “royal 
paternalism” (Bandyopadhaya 1927, 64); this ideal reads something 
akin to a nanny state welfarism where a kindly caring figure “should 
favour the stricken (subjects) like a father”. It was Asoka the Bud-
dhist emperor and grandson of Chandragupta, and not the grand-
father in the same measure, we should note here, who was to live 
rigorously by this paternal ethics.9 “All men are my children and 
just as I desire for my children that they should obtain welfare and 
happiness, both in this world and the next, so do I desire [the same] 
for all men” (in Thapar 1997, 147). While the king, in his administra-
tive benevolence, should “maintain children, aged persons, and 
persons in distress when they are helpless”, his judges in the king-
dom should, Kautilya writes, be cognisant and concerned with the 
troubles of “women, minors, old persons, who are helpless [even] 
when they do not approach (the court)” (AS 3.20.22). The centre of 
this circle of a caring judicial authority thus resides in the king (see 
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Sharma 1978) where the poor and those who need help to support 
themselves, are to be given work and “women who do not stir out 
– those living separately, widows, crippled women, or maidens –
who wish to earn their living, should be given work” (AS 2.23.11). 
After the conquest of an enemy, the king should “render help to the 
distressed, the helpless, and the diseased” (AS 13.15.11). Animals 
too fall within the frame of his paternalistic picture: “Horses inca-
pacitated for work by war, disease, or old age should receive food 
for maintenance” (AS 2.30.27).
While it would be difficult to extricate from Kautilya’s text either 
the idea that his elements of well-being (freedom from hunger, dis-
tress and disease, and indignity) are generally measurable as they 
are to an economist, or that there is any detailed articulation of how 
they extend people’s ‘capabilities’ (to use Sen’s terminology); there 
is nevertheless a Kautilyan vision of polity, where economics and 
ethics meet, where preferences apply not just between outcomes of 
state policy, but between uncertain possibilities as well. That the 
Rawlsian project of articulating notions of just institutions ideally in 
order to address social injustice cannot do without economic ration-
ality is the mainstay of Sen’s argument; but for Kautilya it is the 
institutional forms, that only a sinuous state can exclusively pro-
vide, that are paramount; albeit in the absence of clear ‘public rea-
son’ and open debate about values and principles that Sen finds in 
abundance in India’s ancient argumentative tradition.10
Not wholly consistently perhaps, but Kautilya considered the 
people – comprising a popular army – as the most important of all to 
a strong state. “If weak in might, [a king] should endeavour to se-
cure the welfare of his subjects. The countryside is the source of all 
undertakings; from them comes might” (AS 7.14.18-19). The ‘under-
takings’ of the treasury, the fort, and the army all derive ultimately 
from the people of the countryside. There are echoes here of a Mach-
iavelli republican army as there is of Mao’s idea of a people’s war.
Kautilya’s vijigishu (would-be conqueror) sought power in order 
not only to control the outward behaviour but also the thoughts of 
one’s allies and enemies (see Boesche 2003: 15). Kautilya empha-
sises the role of secret agents, whose duty is to find out what the 
common people are thinking about the monarch. Kautilya stresses 
the utility of spies, especially as dangerous intentions cannot be al-
tered unless the mind of the formless, shapeless enemy is compre-
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hended. Thinking of the utility of force, he seems to be at one with 
the British general Smith who speaks of a new type of war that we 
now have entered where coercion and deterrence form a set of mal-
leable objectives, in ‘fighting amongst the people’, as they relate to 
the intentions and will of the opponent (Smith 2006). Just as for 
Clausewitz, however ambiguous, uncertain and risky any devel-
oped strategy is, it is the mark of war, and for Foucault for whom 
politics is the continuation of war, Kautilya too, like his Chinese 
counterpart Sun Tzu, recognises not only the important objective of 
capturing the will of the people, but also the role of information in 
order to decode what the opponent is thinking. This is crucial for 
the continuation of the state and for keeping anarchy at bay.
A powerless state that does not recognise the use of information 
and force, in Kautilya’s book, ceases to remain a state, and will 
disintegrate internally and fall back into matsya-nyāya (or the state 
of nature). Since the premise of the Kauṭilyan state is very much 
the prevention of backsliding into matsya-nyāya, is the premise nor-
mative or willfully rational?  Maintaining, consolidating, and ex-
panding the power of the state as well as securing happiness for 
the people, as I have been emphasising, are not mutually exclusive 
for Kautilya. Paradoxical as it appears, necessity and normativity 
are at the heart of his thinking: “Material well-being [or artha] alone 
is supreme”, says Kauṭilya. “For spiritual good [dharma or ethics] 
and sensual pleasures [kāma] depend on material well-being” (AS 
I.7.6-7). He makes it clear that for a king who does not exercise 
political power and pursue material wealth for the kingdom, there 
cannot be morality in the political realm. A dialectical relationship 
is set up in his argument between the two pairings: power-wealth 
and ethics. The rationality of state power resides in the long run in 
the norm where welfare and happiness of the people are guaran-
teed. People reduced to poverty where matsya-nyāya (diametrically 
opposed to happiness brought by nyāya and yogakshema) is soaring 
or imminent is not a situation favoured by Kautilya, and is, by all 
means, to be averted.  
Conclusion: ‘capabilities’ and justice
A differential commonality emerges in this reading when examin-
ing a rational-materialist text (that at first grasp appears fully illib-
eral and despotic) from an old Indian tradition alongside arguments 
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in modern political theory (that are by definition assumed to be 
liberal). Whilst liberal as well as conservative accounts of the text as 
an example of Oriental Despotism acknowledge its “reflective self-
knowledge” in the same breath as Aristotle’s polis and Hegel’s Eu-
ropean state (Kedourie 1971: 29), postcolonial perspectives present 
“Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra and Asoka’s edicts [as]… the self-evident 
textual and archaeological refutation of both oriental despotism 
and Asiatic mode of production” (Singh 2011, 16). There are, no 
doubt, contemporary critiques of state power available in the 
works of Arendt (totalitarian), Foucault (disciplinary), and Agam-
ben (biopolitic) that do not take this illiberalism for granted.11 That 
Kautilya openly describes and advocates the somewhat illiberal 
machinations of power (and the potentially desirable uses of 
this) necessarily embedded in statecraft together with “a no-non-
sense institutional view of advancing justice” (Sen 2009: 76) only 
serves as a testimony to his prescience.12 Admittedly, Kautilya’s jus-
tice is not exactly a Rawlsian justice.  I have been arguing that Kau-
tilya meets Sen half-way in his conviction that justice in actual hu-
man affairs (practically-oriented theory of justice as opposed to an 
idealized theory of society) cannot simply be reduced to questions 
of “cumulative outcome (what results)” but also of “comprehensive 
outcome (what results and how it is brought about), as in Rawls’ 
proceduralism” (Bird-Pollan 2010: 106). 
Influenced as Sen is by Indian philosophical thought, including 
Kautilya’s, the distinction between niti and nyāya conceptions of 
justice is crucial in comprehending both these thinkers. The niti, or 
political ethics conception of justice, in Sen’s words, denotes “or-
ganizational propriety and behavioural correctness”, while the 
nyāya conception “stands for a comprehensive concept of realizing 
justice” (2009: 20). What Sen is keen on is the realization of justice; 
he departs from other modern philosophers who obsess about a 
rigorous definition of the concept. For him, “an approach to justice 
can be both entirely acceptable in theory and eminently useable in 
practice, even without its being able to identify the demands of per-
fectly just societies.” (401) Both Kautilya and Sen are aware that just 
institutions do not necessarily ensure social justice, however it is 
conceived. But it is not too difficult to recognise social injustices 
without knowing how a perfectly fair society would organize or 
justify itself.
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Notes
1 AS stands for Arthaśāstra here whenever sutra references to the text are 
cited. I interchangeably use three different translations (Kangle’s, Ran-
garajan’s and Olivelle’s) as they not only have differences in terms of 
either being too literal or metaphoric, but also sometimes render con-
cepts in particular ways that do not always underline the tone and 
tenor I am looking for in my argument.
2 Sen has found Kautilya to be a vitally relevant, though not unique, 
precursor in thinking about measured concerns for human rights and 
Asian values. He also mentions him as a thinker useful on practical 
subjects ranging from famine prevention to administrative effective-
ness. But Sen does not condone Kautilya’s advice to the king as to how 
he can achieve his goals even if it required the trampling of his adver-
saries’ freedom (Sen, 1977).
3 Admittedly, a state in the sense of a modern state does not obtain here, 
but Indian political thinking argues how prestatal conditions devel-
oped into the statal. Sarkar, for example, links the Naturprozess of 
Gumplowicz  or the Hobbesian ‘law of beast and birds’ to the (state of 
nature) nyāya (logic) of matsya (fish) (Sarkar 1921: 80-81) The term 
nyāya also has three distinct meanings: (i) denoting a school of philoso-
phy committed to the use of evidence-based methods of inquiry, in-
cluding observation and inference; (ii) signifying a particular five-step 
pattern of demonstrative reasoning and (iii) referring to a set of heuris-
tic principles to guide practical reason. Sen, as we will see later, uses 
the term (2009) but has only the third sense in mind.  
4 The Chinese thinker Han Feizi lived between 280 –233 BCE and fol-
lows Kautilya by approximately fifty years, and is comparable: “If you 
could assure good government merely by winning the hearts of the 
people, then […] you could simply listen to what the people say. The 
reason you cannot rely upon the wisdom of the people is that they 
have the minds of little children. If the child’s head is not shaved, its 
sores will spread; and if its boil is not lanced, it will become sicker than 
ever. But when it is having its head shaved or its boil lanced, someone 
must hold it while the loving mother performs the operation, and it 
yells and screams incessantly, for it does not understand that the little 
pain it suffers now will bring great benefit later” (Han Feizi: 128). I am 
gesturing, yet again, to the differential commonality in thinking about 
polity in global history.
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5 Pollock has argued that sastra is a genre, a grammar, that presents a 
problematic for mutational practices. A hermeneutics of some of the 
principal genres of disciplinary knowledge, itihasa (narrative history), 
and kavya (poetry), he argues, is imperative for understanding India’s 
heavily regulated pre-modern discourses and the truth effects they 
had (1985).
6 The term ‘unhappy’ subjects does make an appearance in Roger Boe-
sche’s commentary (2003: 22) when he refers to the sutra: “Those, 
however, who are enraged or greedy or frightened or proud, are likely 
to be seduced by enemies” (1.13.22). Kautilya also advises that: “He 
[the King] should manage those who are discontented by means of 
conciliations, gifts, dissension or force” (Kangle, Part II, 2000:29).
7 Amartya Sen notes: “...it is amusing that an Indian political analyst 
from the fourth century BC has to be introduced as a local version of 
an European writer born in the fifteenth century” (2009: xiv).
8 Its contemporary utility can be found at least in two spheres: that it is 
required reading for Pakistani military schools and, like Sun Tzu’s Art 
of War it has also become a manual for the world’s aspiring business-
man. A strategic expert, for instance, is quoted as saying: ‘Kautilya is 
the DNA of India’s foreign policy’ (Michael 2008, 99).
9 Kautilya’s ruthless technocratic economism is alleviated by Asoka’s 
use of a Buddhist ecumenism; the Indologist Heinrich Zimmer sees 
Asoka’s governance as consequence of Kautilyan thought which 
brought this whole historical period into being. Sen has (in his 1986 
lectures) distinguished between Kautilya’s engineering-logistical ap-
proach to political economy and Asoka’s more developed ethical-po-
litical regime.
10 It is not just Sen who spoken about the use of public reason offered by 
India’s traditions. Jonardan Ganeri (2012) in particular draws on In-
dian theory to explain how identities are formed from exercises of rea-
son; he argues that contemporary debates relating to global govern-
ance and superdiverse identities can be enriched from Indian resources 
that developed within a pluralist ethos. Sadly, for our purposes, he 
does not offer any commentary on Kautilya.
11 That Kautilya advocates fining a person with a boat who refuses to 
rescue someone from drowning (AS 4.3.9) or fining someone who 
does not have sex with his wife at the right time is reminiscent of Fou-
cault’s disciplinary state, and totalitarianism in general; the various 
aspects of everyday life in Arthaśāstra “…come in for careful regula-
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tion and adjustment, from the cooking-pot to the crown” (Ramaswa-
my 1994: 32). 
12 Here’s the full quote: “Kautilya’s political economy was based on his 
understanding of the role of institutions both in successful politics and 
in efficient economic performance, and he saw institutional features, 
including restrictions and prohibitions, as major contributors to good 
conduct and necessary restraints on behavioural licence. This is clearly 
a no-nonsense institutional view of advancing justice, and very little 
concession was made by Kautilya to people’s capacity for doing good 
things voluntarily without being led there by well-devised material in-
centives and, when needed, restraint and punishment” (Sen 2009: 76).
